Le trouble du spectre de l’autisme se manifeste par des difficultés d’interaction, de communication sociale et des comportements répétitifs commençant tôt dans la vie d’un enfant. Ce texte explore, à travers des entretiens, le vécu de quatre pères d’enfants atteints de ce trouble au Cameroun. Les résultats de cette étude montrent la souffrance des pères et leur sentiment d’impuissance, qui engendre chez eux une blessure narcissique tout en renforçant leur sentiment d’étrangeté concernant ce handicap et l’enfant atteint. L’étude montre la (...) nécessité d’un soutien psychologique des pères dans le processus de soin des enfants atteints pour en faire, au même titre que les mères, une ressource pour les professionnels du soin et pour l’enfant atteint. (shrink)

Background: The global COVID-19 pandemic has imposed challenges on healthcare systems and professionals worldwide and introduced a ´maelstrom´ of ethical dilemmas. How ethically demanding situations are handled affects employees’ moral stress and job satisfaction. Aim: Describe priority-setting dilemmas, moral distress and support experienced by nurses and physicians across medical specialties in the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in Western Norway. Research design: A cross-sectional hospital-based survey was conducted from 23 April to 11 May 2020. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval granted (...) by the Regional Research Ethics Committee in Western Norway (131421). Findings: Among the 1606 respondents, 67% had experienced priority-setting dilemmas the previous two weeks. Healthcare workers who were directly involved in COVID-19 care, were redeployed or worked in psychiatry/addiction medicine experienced it more often. Although 59% of the respondents had seen adverse consequences due to resource scarcity, severe consequences were rare. Moral distress levels were generally low (2.9 on a 0–10 scale), but higher in selected groups (redeployed, managers and working in psychiatry/addiction medicine). Backing from existing collegial and managerial structures and routines, such as discussions with colleagues and receiving updates and information from managers that listened and acted upon feedback, were found more helpful than external support mechanisms. Priority-setting guidelines were also helpful. Discussion: By including all medical specialties, nurses and physicians, and various institutions, the study provides information on how the COVID-19 mitigation also influenced those not directly involved in the COVID-19 treatment of patients. In the next stages of the pandemic response, support for healthcare professionals directly involved in outbreak-affected patients, those redeployed or those most impacted by mitigation strategies must be a priority. Conclusion: Empirical research of healthcare workers experiences under a pandemic are important to identify groups at risks and useful support mechanisms. (shrink)

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief (...) revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state. (shrink)

Paradoxically, the practical necessity of love seems to combine the personal character of psychological necessity with the inescapable and authoritative quality of moral necessity. Traditionally, philosophers have avoided this paradox by treating love as an amalgam of impersonal evaluative judgments and affective responses. On my account, love participates in a different form of practical necessity, one characterized by a non-moral yet normative type of expectation. This expectation is best understood as a kind of second-personal address that does not support derivative (...) third-personal demands. It is revealed when we react with hurt feelings instead of resentment upon its disappointment. (shrink)

Ethical dilemmas are part of medicine, but the type of challenges, the frequency of their occurrence and the nuances in the difficulties have not been systematically studied in low-income settings. The objective of this paper was to map out the ethical dilemmas from the perspective of Ethiopian physicians working in public hospitals. A national survey of physicians from 49 public hospitals using stratified, multi-stage sampling was conducted in six of the 11 regions in Ethiopia. Descriptive statistics were used and the (...) responses to the open-ended question “If you have experienced any ethical dilemma, can you please describe a dilemma you have encountered in your own words?” were analyzed using a template analysis process. A total of 587 physicians responded, and 565 met the inclusion criteria. Twelve of 24 specified ethically challenging situations were reported to be experienced often or sometimes by more than 50% of the physicians. The most frequently reported challenge concerned resource distribution: 93% agreed that they often or sometimes had to make difficult choices due to resource limitation, and 83% often or sometimes encountered difficulties because patients were unable to pay for the preferred course of treatment. Other frequently reported difficulties were doubts about doing good or harming the patient, relating to conflicting views, concern for family welfare, disclosure issues and caring for patients not able to consent. Few reported dilemmas related to end-of-life issues. The 200 responses to the open-ended question mirrored the quantitative results. Ethiopian physicians report ethical challenges related more to bedside rationing and fairness concerns than futility discussions and conflicts about autonomy as described in studies from high-income countries. In addition to the high report of experienced challenges, gravity of the dilemmas that are present in their narratives are striking. Recognition of the everyday experiences of physicians in low-income settings should prompt the development of ethics teaching and support mechanisms, discussion of ethical guidelines as well as increase our focus on how to improve the grave resource scarcity they describe. (shrink)

This study investigated attitudes toward the use of deception in negotiation, with particular attention to the distinction between deception regarding the informational elements of the interaction (e.g., lying about or misrepresenting needs or preferences) and deception about emotional elements (e.g., misrepresenting one's emotional state). We examined how individuals judge the relative ethical appropriateness of these alternative forms of deception, and how these judgments relate to negotiator performance and long-run reputation. Individuals viewed emotionally misleading tactics as more ethically appropriate to use (...) in negotiation than informational deception. Approval of deception predicted negotiator performance in a negotiation simulation and also general reputation as a negotiator, but the nature of these relationships depended on the kind of deception involved. (shrink)

This article analyses the general ethical milieu in a nursing home for elderly residents and provides a decision-making model for analysing the ethical situations that arise. It considers what it means for the residents to live together and for the staff to be in ethically problematic situations when caring for residents. An interpretative phenomenological approach and Sandman’s ethical model proved useful for this purpose. Systematic observations were carried out and interpretation of the general ethical milieu was summarized as ‘being in (...) the same world without meeting’. Two themes and four subthemes emerged from the analysis. Three different ethical problems were analysed. The outcome of using the decision-making model highlighted the discrepancy between the solutions used and well-founded solutions to these problems. An important conclusion that emerged from this study was the need for a structured tool for reflection. (shrink)

Radzikowska and Kerre developed L-fuzzy rough set as a fuzzy generalisation of the notion of rough sets. Specifically, they have taken a residuated lattice L as the underlying set of truth degrees. However, in real life, we may encounter situations where truth degrees are not always linear, or where the existence of the least upper bound of two elements is no longer required. Instead, there may be the possibility of having minimal upper bounds, and dually, maximal lower bounds, multilattices have (...) become a suitable algebraic structure for addressing such cases. Our aim is to extend Radzikowska and Kerre's work by replacing a residuated lattice with a multilattice M, thereby obtaining a more flexible structure. We define M-fuzzy rough sets using operators derived from adjoint pairs within the multilattice M. For a tolerance and an equivalence M-fuzzy relation, we define an appropriate M-fuzzy rough set and investigate its properties. (shrink)

As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such, problems that require reasoning about games can be solved by the (...) standard methods for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation: first, we formalise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to obtain an increased understanding of the experiences of elderly people in geriatric care, with special reference to integrity. Data were collected through qualitative interviews with elderly people and, in order to obtain a description of caregivers’ integrity-promoting or non-promoting behaviours, participant observations and qualitative interviews with nursing students were undertaken. Earlier studies on the integrity of elderly people mainly concentrated on their personal and territorial space, so Kihlgren and Thorsén opened up the possibility (...) of considering the concept of integrity from a broader view by recognizing its relationship to the larger framework of the self-concept. Based on this, findings in the present study indicate that elderly people’s integrity relating to their corporal self were the least violated. On the other hand, their psycological, information and cultural selves were the most exposed. The study also identified a further dimension (i.e. one relating to social self), which should be included in the concept of integrity because respecting elderly people’s social self reduces their feelings of loneliness, isolation and seclusion. In summary, the results indicate that the concept of integrity is complex and has several dimensions. (shrink)

Continuing medico-technical progress has led toan increasing medicalisation of pregnancy andchildbirth. One of the most common technologiesin this context is ultrasound. Based on someidentified `pro-technology feminist theories',notably the postmodernist feminist discourse,the technology of ultrasound is analysedfocusing mainly on social and political ratherthan clinical issues. As empirical researchsuggests, ultrasound is welcomed by themajority of women. The analysis, however, showsthat attitudes and decisions of women areinfluenced by broader social aspects. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the visualtechnology of ultrasound, in addition to otherreproductive technology (...) in maternity care, islinked to the `personification' of the foetusand has therefore contributed to a new image ofthe foetus. The exploration of these issueschallenges some arguments of feministdiscourse. It draws attention to possibleadverse implications of the technology forwomen's reproductive freedom and indicates theimportance of the topic for politicaldiscussions. (shrink)

This paper provides a formal analysis on the solutions of the frame problem by using dynamic logic. We encode Pednault's syntax-based solution, Baker's state-minimization policy, and Gelfond & Lifchitz's Action Language A in the propositional dynamic logic (PDL). The formal relationships among these solutions are given. The results of the paper show that dynamic logic, as one of the formalisms for reasoning about dynamic domains, can be used as a formal tool for comparing, analyzing and unifying logics of action.

People who make graveside promises consider themselves bound by them, which raises the question of whether a promise can morally obligate a promisor directly to a promisee who cannot acknowledge the promise. I show that it can by using the theoretical framework provided by “transaction accounts” of promising. Paradigmatically, these accounts maintain that the creation of a promissory obligation requires that the promisee consent to the promise. I extend these accounts to capture promises made by proxy and self-promises, and conclude (...) that we can make promises to absent promisees when we bear responsibility for their moral and personal development. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Right HeartIngrid GouldI remarked to a friend, “We haven’t spoken since my arrest!” Alarm and confusion clouded his face, given my half-century of squeaky-clean living. “Cardiac arrest,” I clarified. “The fire department rebooted me.”An electrophysiologist diagnosed Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Dysplasia, prescribed medication, and implanted a defibrillator. For the next three-and-a-half years, he helped me live with a disease I didn’t know existed until he told me I had (...) it.The disease progressed—an ironic, disease-centric term since its advancement was to my detriment— prompting my cardiologist to recommend seeing someone who specialized in heart failure. I resisted the very idea of heart failure, a terrible term for a struggling organ, but took her advice and scheduled an appointment.The new cardiologist urged transplant testing, a lengthy process. I agreed, figuring that by the time I needed a new heart in 15–20 years, they’d be rolling off 3D printers.To record occasional transplant musings and inchoate fears and perhaps, over time, untangle them, I began journaling. I chronicled my passage through the echocardiogram, heart catheterization, 31 tubes of bloodwork, interviews with different clinical specialties, a pulmonary function test in a machine reminiscent of Star Trek’s Transporter, and more. Testing had barely begun when my medication stopped working—a Halloween shock.I began a harsher medication, underwent an ablation, and spent six weeks in a wearable defibrillator, a vest with abundant wires, and a purse-sized battery pack that made me resemble a character in [End Page 123] the Jetsons. This attire did not bring holiday comfort or joy to the TSA1 when I flew to visit my sister. As my R-waves faded to a whisper, I swapped the vest for a second implanted defibrillator, substantially more sensitive than the first.In early 2018, we learned I had qualified for transplant listing, though I wished to get as much mileage as possible from the original engine. My cardiologist warned, “There is no Plan B—no machine, device, or medication for the long-term. You will need a transplant.” He explained that since most cardiac patients have left-heart problems, companies develop products for the left side of the heart. My problem was on the right—a tiny market. He also cautioned that a patient needs to be sick enough to warrant transplant and well enough to remain a candidate, survive the surgery, and recover.Although clinically I was ready, I was not personally ready. I felt too good to trade an excellent quality of life for the promised miserable post-transplant year. The cardiologist wisely asked if I wanted to speak with another patient. When I requested someone beyond the dreaded first year, he put me in touch with two women who had received new hearts a few years earlier and befriended each other. They soon became my invaluable mentors and cherished friends. I will never forget seeing them stride into our first meeting and thinking, “They are beautiful! They look totally normal!”By May, climbing four flights of stairs took as much effort as five used to take. Tests confirmed further deterioration and suggested I had 7–13 months of declining health before my heart would give out completely. We chose a date for hospital admission, and I started telling people outside my immediate family. Most were flabbergasted, believing heart transplants were the last hope of the desperately ill. I did not look moribund, though, apparently, I was.The eight months after my first transplant appointment let me prepare psychologically to bid farewell to my heart—the metaphor for kindness, love, and bravery in our culture—and to welcome a new organ from a generous person less medically fortunate than I.In the hospital, I met others awaiting their hearts. A sudden intimacy arises when mortal choices catapult people into a medical realm suggestive of science fiction. Add the emotional intensity that accompanies knowing your extended life comes courtesy of a person who breathes no more on this earth and you wonder how an organ recipient integrates sorrow and gratitude.Two weeks after I was hospitalized, my cardiologist informed me the wait was over... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to sketch a conception of a posthuman subject in which we can recognize a cognitive dimension. Through Hayles’s widened notion of cognition, I argue that we can retain the interpreting subject within posthumanism and thereby view it as entrenched in the surrounding world. Nonconscious- and conscious cognition, which are the terms that Hayles utilizes, shows how both non-human cognizing systems and the human subject widens while remaining level specific. The text concludes with a discussion (...) of how my alternative has implications for methods of inquiry. (shrink)

La universidad adecuó la formación profesional hacia la virtualidad, adaptando con ello la teoría y la practica de las distintas materias, en ese nuevo contexto el objetivo de este estudio fue desarrollar un juego de simulación de selección de talento humano y describir la experiencia de juego en pandemia. Con un enfoque metodológico cuantitativo, diseño descriptivo no experimental transeccional, aplicado a estudiantes del VIII ciclo del curso de Gestión de Recursos Humanos. Se concluye que el juego simulado es una herramienta (...) que facilita el aprendizaje de forma virtual, asimismo contribuye con el aprendizaje del tema propuesto, de una forma organizada, dinámica y divertida. (shrink)

Twenty-four children (aged 5 months to 18 years) who were admitted to a university hospital were observed for a total of 135 hours with the aim of describing their degree of participation in decisions concerning their own care. Grading of their participation was made by using a 5-point scale. An assessment was also made of what was considered as optimal participation in each situation. The results indicate that children are not always allowed to participate in decision making to the extent (...) that is considered optimal. In no case was it judged that a child participated in or was forced to make a decision that was too difficult for the child. The interactions between children, parents and staff were also described in connection with discussions and decision-making processes. This showed that parents do not always support their children in difficult situations and that health care staff often inform children about what is going to happen without presenting alternatives or asking for their views. Staff may, however, find themselves facing an ethical conflict in deciding between supporting a child’s view or following hospital routine. It is of great importance that children are looked upon as potentially autonomous individuals and that staff members realize that one of their core duties is to facilitate children’s participation in decision making concerning their health care. (shrink)

The category of “former friend” is familiar, yet the nature of this relationship type remains underexplored. Aristotle, for example, poses but does not answer the question of what constitute appropriate relations between former friends. To elucidate post-friendship expectations, I promote an account of friendship according to which some of our most significant friendships participate in a type of intimacy characterized by having normative standing to interpret each other in a constitutive manner, which I call the “co-interpretation view” of friendship. Unchecked (...) powers of co-interpretation, however, invite and allow for violations of each friend’s personhood, so I draw on Kantian resources to guide the co-interpretation view and render it more plausible. These Kantian resources help to establish relevant expectations for co-interpretation between friends. This positions me to provide an account of appropriate expectations between former friends, which I analyze in three types of post-friendship circumstance: when the friendship has faded but the parties still share a general outlook; when the friendship has become damaging for the friends but not due to viciousness; and, when the friendship ruptures due to vicious behaviors. (shrink)

In this article, Ingrid Andersson discusses the decolonial philosophy of Sylvia Wynter, with a special focus on addressing her concepts of the hybrid human and origin stories. Andersson shows how Wynter's philosophizing about the being of being human is premised on an entanglement of nature and culture that is on par with the posthuman understanding of the ontological inseparability of matter and discourse. She goes on to interrogate some productive tensions between Wynter's decolonial philosophy and posthumanism by pointing out (...) how Wynter's hybrid human formulates an understanding of human nature that is different in itself and not solely in relation to other nonhuman entities. In the final part of the article, she proposes how we, with Wynter, can devise a pedagogical approach that seeks to counteract harmful taxonomizing practices. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 249-270, June 2022.

Background: According to ethical guidelines, healthcare professionals should be able to provide care that allows for the patients’ values, customs and beliefs, and the existential issues that are communicated through them. One widely discussed issue is existential loneliness. However, much of the debate dealing with existential loneliness concludes that both the phenomenon and the concept are quite vague. Aim: To clarify what constitutes existential loneliness, and to describe its lived experiences. A further aim was to provide a definition of existential (...) loneliness that can function as a tool for identifying the phenomenon and for differentiating it from other kinds of loneliness. Method: A literature review including theoretical and empirical studies. Different search strategies were used to gather the articles included in the study. The analysis of the empirical studies had an interpretative approach. The articles were also analysed with the aim of providing a definition of existential loneliness. This was done by means of criteria such as language, uniqueness, theory and usefulness. This study is not empirical and does therefore not require an ethics review. Results: The analysis resulted in two main characteristics. The first one was perceiving oneself as inherently separated (disconnected) from others and from the universe. The second one brings out emotional aspects of EL, such as isolation, alienation, emptiness and a feeling of being abandoned. The empirical findings were divided into two categories: experiences of EL and circumstances in which EL arises. A definition of EL is also suggested, based on the two main characteristics identified. Conclusion: In order to meet patients’ needs, it is an ethical duty for healthcare staff to be able to recognise experiences of EL, that is, to communicate with the patients about these experiences in an appropriate manner. This in turn demands knowledge about existential issues and skills to deal with them. (shrink)

Human embryos produced in labs since the 1970s have generated layers of uncertainty for law and policy: ontological, moral, and administrative. Ontologically, these lab-made entities fall into a gray zone between life and not-yet-life. Should in vitro embryos be treated as inanimate matter, like abandoned postsurgical tissue, or as private property? Morally, should they exist largely outside of state control in the zone of free reproductive choice or should they be regarded as autonomous human lives and thus entitled to constitutional (...) protection like full-fledged citizens? Administratively, if they deserve protection, what institutional and policy mechanisms are best suited to carrying out the necessary oversight? Using a method termed comparative problematization, this article traces divergent answers to these questions produced in three countries—the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany—across the last twenty-five years. Comparison reveals distinct bioconstitutional foundations that give rise to systematically different understandings of each state’s responsibilities toward human life and hence its particular treatment of claims on behalf of embryonic lives. (shrink)

During the past decade, screening tests using computed tomography have disseminated into practice and been marketed to patients despite neither conclusive evidence nor professional agreement about their efficacy and cost-effectiveness at the population level. This phenomenon raises questions about physicians' professional roles and responsibilities within the setting of medical innovation, as well as the appropriate scope of patient autonomy and access to unproven screening technology. This article explores how physicians ought to respond when new screening examinations that lack conclusive evidence (...) of overall population benefit emerge in the marketplace and are requested by individual patients. To this end, the article considers the nature of evidence and how it influences decision-making for screening at both the public policy and individual patient levels. We distinguish medical and ethical differences between screening recommended for a population and screening considered on an individual patient basis. Finally, we discuss specific cases to explore how evidence, patient risk factors and preferences, and physician judgment ought to balance when making individual patient screening decisions. (shrink)

Social-emotional competences are critical for positive development and significantly predict educational and occupational attainment, health, and well-being. There is however a lack of consensus about the number of core competences, and how these are defined and operationalized. This divergence in approach challenges future research as well as the scientific usefulness of the construct. In an effort to create an integrative framework, this focused review evaluates different approaches of conceptualizing and assessing social-emotional competences. Building on shared conceptions, an integrative taxonomy “DOMASEC” (...) is introduced, specifying core domains and manifestations of social-emotional competences that bridge across frameworks focusing on social and emotional learning, personality traits and self-determination theory. Core domains include intrapersonal, interpersonal and task-oriented competencies, differentiating between affective, cognitive, and behavioral manifestations of competences across these domains. It is argued that the integrative taxonomy facilitates the conceptual specification of key constructs, that it helps to better organize the multitude of terms and definitions used, and to guide the conceptualization and operationalization of social-emotional competences and their various facets. (shrink)

People with dementia have previously not been active participants in research, with ethical difficulties often being cited as the reason for this. A wider inclusion of people with dementia in research raises several ethical and methodological challenges. This article adds to the emerging debate by reflecting on the ethical and methodological issues raised during an interview study involving people with dementia and their spouses. The study sought to explore the impact of living with dementia. We argue that there is support (...) for the inclusion of people with dementia in research and that the benefits of participation usually far outweigh the risks, particularly when a `safe context' has been created. The role of gatekeepers as potentially responsible for excluding people with dementia needs further consideration, with particular reference to the appropriateness of viewing consent as a primarily cognitive, universalistic and exclusionary event as opposed to a more particularistic, inclusive and context relevant process. (shrink)

This monograph on the capability approach does two things. First, it provides an advanced introduction to the capability approach, as an account used in philosophy, as well as other disciplines. Second, it provides an account of the capability approach which is able to encompass all existing views and theories on the capability approach, including the writings on the capability approach by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.

My dissertation, “Love, Self-Constitution, and Practical Necessity,” offers an interpretation of love between people. Love is puzzling because it appears to involve essentially both rational and non-rational phenomena. We are accountable to those we love, so love seems to participate in forms of necessity, commitment, and expectation, which are associated with morality. But non-rational attitudes—forms of desire, attraction, and feeling—are also central to love. Consequently, love is not obviously based in rationality or inclination. In contrast to views that attempt to (...) fit love into existing models of practical reasoning, I argue that love participates in a unique form of practical necessity, different from both moral and psychological necessity, yet bearing resemblances to each. Distinctive to this type of practical necessity is a direct appeal to another particular person that cannot be delivered in third-personal terms—that is, a non-moral yet normative type of expectation on another person. This type of expectation is predominant in loving relationships, but can also make better sense of the experiences of humor and beauty, as well as attitudes like forgiveness, gratitude, and agent-regret. I treat Immanuel Kant’s discussion of the experience of beauty in the Critique of Judgment and Christine Korsgaard’s work on self-constitution as fruitful starting points for this account of love. I conclude that our loving relationships enable us to have distinctive personal selves, and provide support for this account of love by offering a complementary theory of grief. In Part One of the dissertation, I focus on two prominent approaches to love characteristic of the sentimentalist and rationalist traditions. I begin with the work of David Hume, which treats desire (understood as something like a simple impulse or craving) as the paradigmatic mental state, and emphasizes our personal and affective dimensions. Hume has the valuable insight that loving someone affects our sense of ourselves. But Hume’s view becomes unsatisfying when he claims that love is essentially enfeebling, implying that to love is to be passive toward and readily overcome by another person. While this indicates Hume’s awareness that love involves being open and receptive to another person, the problem is that love is also a demanding attitude. Hume lacks the conceptual resources to offer a nuanced view of the self, in which we can—with one attitude—be both demanding of and vulnerable to another person. Hume’s model of a desire-based deliberative process has recently been revived in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions on love and rationality. Frankfurt, however, goes beyond Hume’s picture of the self by introducing a notion of “identification,” which he offers to make sense of our apparent ability to commit ourselves decisively to certain projects or people. I argue that active powers like identification and commitment cannot be accommodated within any basically Humean moral psychology. Such abilities, and with them the possibility of love, depend on something closer to a Kantian conception of rational agency. I next focus on the work of Kant, who provides the substantial counterpart to Humean-inspired moral theories, but is not known for his insight into our emotional lives. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love into “practical love”—what we experience when we are morally motivated to help someone—and “pathological love”—what we experience when we feel fond of something. But in reality, we experience love neither as a mere preference for another person, nor as something that generates the kind of demands that would be binding on any rational creature. David Velleman attempts to remedy the deficiency of Kant’s dichotomy. Velleman offers a Kantian theory in which he describes love and respect as two ends of a continuum of attitudes that it is morally appropriate to have toward people. Velleman’s view has the peculiar implication that everyone deserves the love of everyone else, and I argue that this is a fatal flaw. Like Kant and Velleman, Korsgaard characterizes personal love as involving the treatment of other people as Kantian ends-in-themselves to a heightened degree. Korsgaard, though, also contends that our individual identities depend upon our personal relationships, and I take this position seriously for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, however, characterizations of loving relations as subsets of moral relations can account for the authority of the demands of love, but not its particularity. The major conclusion of Part One is that any attempt to understand love primarily on a model of practical reasoning with which we are already familiar is doomed to fail. Our experience of love calls for a theory of a unique type of practical necessity. In Part Two I take seriously the possibility that love is simultaneously inescapable (in something like the way morality is supposed to be), and yet ineluctably personal. In love, we experience an engagement with a person as essentially particular, rather than as an instance of a rational agent in general. To make sense of this direct attachment to an individual, I argue that love involves distinctive forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love let us down, they hurt our feelings, which is not a response to a failed prediction, but nor is it a reaction to a moral insult or offense. According to Peter Strawson and Stephen Darwall, second-personal moral reactive attitudes (such as resentment) always have third-personal analogues (such as indignation). In contrast, I argue that the type of hurt feelings associated with love is a second-personal reactive attitude that does not have a third-personal corollary. I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. On my interpretation, Kant introduces this different type of expectation in the Critique of Judgment. Whereas he characterizes moral judgments as universally communicable, judgments of beauty implicitly involve only second-personal address: I appeal to your direct experience with a particular object. This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which it involves a uniquely second-personal form of practical necessity. I contend that the second-personal addresses we make in love are appeals to strengthen the intimacy implicit in the loving relationship, and I identify three interrelated dimensions of that intimacy. First, those we love have the standing to interpret us in a constitutive manner. We fine-tune and make determinate the character of our concerns and interests in part by accepting the interpretations provided by those we love. In that way, the people we love have the normative power to constitute who we are. Second, we share a perspective with those we love in a way that is not reducible to or derivative of our independent perspectives. Loving someone centrally involves the activity of forming concerns together, and we do this in a mode best understood on the model of playing a spontaneous game or improvising music. Finally, being loved enables us to see ourselves as distinctive and special, because the concern those who love us have for us does not track the objective merit of our characteristics. These dimensions of the intimacy that characterizes a loving relationship reveal what it is that we appeal for in love, and how we are hurt when our appeals are rebuffed. In broad terms, this dissertation advocates the recognition of a non-moral yet normative type of expectation, which is predominant in loving relationships. Humor and beauty, too, make more sense when understood in terms of this non-moral yet normative type of expectation, as they involve appeals to others that are more than mere predictions of, but less than rational demands for, a certain kind of response. Introducing this alternative notion of expectation into the discourse of moral philosophy can shed light on other common attitudes that are clearly normative, but defy translation into objective, third-personal terms. Such attitudes include certain experiences of pride and shame, apology and forgiveness, the bestowing of mercy, gratitude, agent-regret, and perhaps a basic sense of trust we have in others. Ultimately, I situate love in respect to grief, which demonstrates my theory’s ability to make sense of related dimensions of our emotional lives. The people we love and grieve over give us a sense of who we are as distinctive, particular individuals, as the three interrelated dimensions of intimacy in loving relationships reveal. Consequently, grief is best understood as a type of practical disorientation—namely, a disorientation that involves the loss of the personal self. I present my account of grief against the type of account that would draw philosophical conclusions about the nature of love and grief from empirical psychological data alone. In particular, these data indicate that we recover quickly from the deaths of loved ones, and Dan Moller draws the philosophical conclusion that those we love fulfill certain roles in our lives and are replaceable. In contrast, I contend that while we should acknowledge the truth of the objective judgment, made in the third-person, that we will likely recover after the deaths of those we love, it does not follow that we must affirm such a claim from the internal perspective of one person who loves another. As a result, the case of love and grief supports a general claim concerning the proper work of moral philosophy, which is that the understanding of ourselves gained through empirical data is not a substitute for the normative conclusions that are revealed through first-personal reflections on our relationships. (shrink)

This article is based on an empirical study regarding ethical challenges in intercultural nursing. The focus is on autonomy and disclosure. Autonomy is a human capacity that has become an important ethical principle in nursing. Although the relationship between autonomy and patients’ possibly harmful choices is discussed, the focus is on ‘forced’ autonomy. Nurses seem to equate respect with autonomy; it seems to be hard to cope with the fact that there are patients who voluntarily undergo treatment but who actively (...) participate neither in the treatment offered nor in making choices regarding that treatment. Nurses’ demand for patients to be autonomous may in some cases jeopardize the respect, integrity and human worth that the ethical principle of autonomy is meant to ensure. Even though respect for a person’s autonomy is also respect for the person, one’s respect for the person in question should not depend on his or her capacity or aptitude to act autonomously. Is autonomy necessarily a universal ethical principle? This article negates this question and, through the issues of culture, individualism versus collectivism, first- and second- order autonomy, communication and the use of family interpreters, and respect, an attempt is made to explain why. (shrink)

Throughout the ages, the mystery of what happens when we die and the nature of the human mind has fascinated humankind. In this collection of essays, leading scientists and authors contemplate the nature of consciousness, quantum mechanics, string theory, dimensions, space and time, non-local space, the hologram, and the effect of death on the consciousness"--Provided by publisher.

In this collection of new essays scientists, psychologists, theoretical physicists and other experts in the mind-body connection explore the nature of consciousness and its future as a new paradigm in science. This volume clarifies the meaning of consciousness and establishes a model for further exploration of a burgeoning realm of scientific study.

From the co-founder and president of PETA, Ingrid Newkirk, and bestselling author Gene Stone comes Animalkind, a book that offers both a tour of the wonderful world of animals and a guide to simple ways in which we can reduce the harm we cause them in our everyday lives.

Choosing a compassionate lifestyle that makes you feel good and positively impacts on the environment and on animals has never been easier. In this practical and accessible handbook, loaded with resources for all products that are mentioned, Ingrid Newkirk presents fabulous options that will not only enhance your life, but those of your neighbors, your community, animals, and the earth itself. From comfortable home furnishings, to delicious foods, to fashionable clothing there are a myriad of choices to be made (...) that can have a lasting positive effect on the well-being of animals and the environment, including: - recognizing hidden animal ingredients in cosmetics and household products - raising ecologically aware and animal-friendly kids - creating healthy, environmentally-friendly meals for everyday and special occasions - dressing with style without using leather or other animal products - dealing kindly with mice, insects, and other 'pests' in home or garden - adopting the right animal companion for you - volunteering and investing in eco- and animal-friendly companies - traveling with Eco-consciousness. (shrink)

With more than two million members and supporters, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) is the world’s largest animal-rights organization, and its founder and president, Ingrid Newkirk, is one of the most well-known and most effective activists in America. She has spearheaded worldwide efforts to improve the treatment of animals in manufacturing, entertainment, and elsewhere. Every day, in laboratories, food factories, and other industries, animals by the millions are subjected to inhumane cruelty. In this accessible guide, Newkirk (...) teaches readers hundreds of simple ways to stop thoughtless animal cruelty and make positive choices. For each topic, Newkirk provides hard facts, personal insight, inspiration, ideas, and resources, including: • How to eat healthfully and compassionately • How to adopt animals rather than support puppy mills • How to make their vote count and change public opinion • How to switch to cruelty-free cosmetics and clothing • How to choose amusements that protect rather than exploit animals. With public concern for the well-being of animals greater than ever—particularly among young people—this timely, practical book offers exciting and easy ways to make a difference. (shrink)

Social enterprises are seen as innovative towards solving societal problems, but little research exists on possible negative aspects, the so‐called dark sides. In this study, the emphasis is on dark sides of social entrepreneurship, how they are managed, and how systems thinking can contribute towards managing these effects. Dark sides of social entrepreneurship can take many forms, like unethical or insincere motives and unintended outcomes like the negative impact on the well‐being of founders and employees, but they are also a (...) call for a critical reflection on the role of the government in society and the economic system social enterprises have to operate in. This paper aims to contribute to the dark side theory of social entrepreneurship by linking system archetypes to themes of dark side thereby stressing how management strategies act as balancing feedback loops to mitigate or prevent dark sides. A qualitative research was conducted by interviewing 21 respondents who play an important role in the world of social entrepreneurship in Belgium. The results show that dark sides of social enterprises manifest itself mostly in the form of trade‐offs and financial, business, and management related issues. Taking over the habits of profit‐oriented companies emerged as a new dark side element. Management strategies include anchoring goals, transparency, obtaining external views, changing the system, and above all reflection. The latter is an important first step to become aware of these issues to be able to change the negative dynamism of these dark sides. (shrink)

In this article, a teleological model for analysis of everyday ethical situations in dementia care is used to analyse and clarify perennial ethical problems in nursing home care for persons with dementia. This is done with the aim of describing how such a model could be useful in a concrete care context. The model was developed by Sandman and is based on four aspects: the goal; ethical side-constraints to what can be done to realize such a goal; structural constraints; and (...) nurses’ ethical competency. The model contains the following main steps: identifying and describing the normative situation; identifying and describing the different possible alternatives; assessing and evaluating the different alternatives; and deciding on, implementing and evaluating the chosen alternative. Three ethically difficult situations from dementia care were used for the application of the model. The model proved useful for the analysis of nurses’ everyday ethical dilemmas and will be further explored to evaluate how well it can serve as a tool to identify and handle problems that arise in nursing care. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

The aim of this literature study was to suggest a value ground for nursing anchored in two ethical principles: the principle of human value and the right to experience a meaningful life. Previous nursing research between the years 2000 and 2009 was analysed. Presented values suggested in this value ground are thus in line with the nursing context and science of today. Statements within ethical literature have been used in order to formulate arguments aimed at supporting the values that were (...) found in the study. In the literature study six values were found: trust, nearness, sympathy, support, knowledge and responsibility. These values hold equal status and are not presented in hierarchical order. They vary due to the persons involved, nursing situations and cultural surroundings, but have the common requirement of being non-excluding. In order to implement the values within the value ground, two prerequisites are discussed and claimed as essential: ethical dialogue and a caring encounter between care provider and patients. (shrink)